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I. INTRODUCTION
War should not force children to forfeit their education or risk exposure to
sexual violence, forced labor, forced recruitment, injury, or death.1
International law requires that civilians be spared the hazards of war.2
Moreover, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Children’s
Convention),3 the most widely ratified international human rights treaty,
implicates the child’s right to education.4 However, a quarter of a century
after the adoption of the Children’s Convention, the right to education
“remains merely aspirational,” as one nongovernment organization has
recognized.5 Armed forces continue to use schools and universities during
armed conflict, disrupting education around the world and putting both
teachers and students at substantial risk of harm.6 There is a clear conflict

1 Bede Sheppard, Guest Post: Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use,
OPINIO JURIS (Dec. 16, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/12/16/guest-post-protect
ing-schools-universities-military-use/ (noting that these dangers arise when armed groups
convert schools and universities into bases, barracks, firing positions, or places to cache
weapons and ammunition).
2 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. There are 196 states party to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and 173 states party to both the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977
Additional Protocol I. See States Parties: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions,
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.
xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=470.
Syria ratified
Additional Protocol I on November 14, 1983, without attaching any reservations or
declarations relevant to the question under review. Id.
3 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Children’s Convention]. This treaty, which entered into force on September 2, 1990, has 196
parties, including two nonmembers of the United Nations, the Holy See and the State of
Palestine. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Convention on the Rights of the Child, https://treaties.
un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-11.en.pdf.
The only
nonparty states are the United States and Somalia, both of which have signed the treaty but not
deposited instruments of ratification, along with the United Nations’ newest member state,
South Sudan. Id. Syria ratified the 1989 Children’s Convention on July 15, 1993, without
attaching any reservations or declarations relevant to the question under review. Id.
4
Press Release, Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA), 25 Years
after Landmark Treaty, Children’s Rights Still Violated with Impunity in Conflict (Nov. 20,
2014), http:// protectingeducation.org/news/25-years-after-landmark-treaty-children%E2%80
%99s-rights-still-violated-impunity-conflict.
5 Id.
6 GCPEA, COMMENTARY ON THE “GUIDELINES FOR PROTECTING SCHOOLS AND
UNIVERSITIES FROM MILITARY USE DURING ARMED CONFLICT” 4–5 (2014) [hereinafter

342

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 44:339

between the vision of protecting access to education and the reality of what
young people experience in countries impacted by the turmoil of war.7
The need for explicit standards and norms to protect schools from use by
military forces resulted in the release of the Guidelines for Protecting
Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict (the
Guidelines) in 2014.8 This document, which provides recommendations to
avoid the use of schools during armed conflict, emerged as a potential
solution.9 This Note will evaluate the potential effectiveness of the
Guidelines in protecting schools and universities from military use during
armed conflict. Part II will demonstrate the inherent problems arising from
the military use of schools during armed conflict as evidenced by its effect in
Syria. It will also discuss the creation of the Guidelines, the content of the
Guidelines, and the Guidelines’ desired effect. Part III will address the gap
in preexisting written and enforceable law. Part IV will analyze the
effectiveness of the Guidelines by first comparing the advantages and
disadvantages of hard law and soft law. Second, it will evaluate the
Guidelines against key criteria set out by the Global Coalition to Protect
Education from Attack, the nongovernment organization that effectuated the
Guidelines. Lastly, this Note will recommend that states adopt the
Guidelines, and suggest amendments and additions to the Guidelines, namely
inclusion of a reparations structure and accountability mechanisms.

COMMENTARY ON THE GUIDELINES], available at http://www.protectingeducation.org/sites/def
ault/files/documents/commentary_on_the_guidelines.pdf.
7 Id.
8
Id.
9 Id. at 7. The Guidelines were released on December 16, 2014 in Geneva, Switzerland, and
represent “the culmination of over two years of extensive consultations with governments,
militaries, UN agencies, and civil society to develop guidance to keep armed parties out of
schools and universities.” New International Guidelines Address an Insidious Gap in Protecting
Education during War, GCPEA (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.protectingeducation.org/news/ne
w-international-guidelines-address-insidious-gap-protecting-education-during-war.
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II. PROBLEM AND PROPOSED SOLUTION: THE MILITARY USE OF SCHOOLS,
ESPECIALLY IN SYRIA, AND THE GUIDELINES FOR PROTECTING SCHOOLS
AND UNIVERSITIES FROM MILITARY USE DURING ARMED CONFLICT AS A
POSSIBLE SOLUTION
A. Military Use of Schools Has Been Extremely Grave during Syria’s Civil
War
1. Overall Problem
Some men came to our village. I tried to escape, but they took
me to jail. Except it wasn’t a jail—it was my old school. It’s
ironic—they took me there to torture me, in the same place I
used to go to school to learn. . . . They had taken over the
school and made it into a torture center.10
This quote, from a fifteen-year-old boy from Syria, a country plagued by
civil war since 2011,11 exemplifies the problems arising from armed forces’
utilization of schools and universities during times of war. This section will
present statistics and examples that illustrate the staggering gravity of this
exploitation of school property. These ill effects make apparent the looming
need for a quickly adoptable and effective solution.
The toll experienced by children during armed conflict is multifold.12 As
has been well publicized, children are being recruited and used by armed
forces.13 In response to this conflict, Leila Zerrougui, the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict
joined with the U.N. International Children’s Emergency Fund, popularly
known as UNICEF, to initiate “Children, Not Soldiers,” a global campaign
seeking support to end the recruitment of children for armed conflict by

10 GCPEA, PROTECT SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES FROM MILITARY USE 6 (2013), http://
www.protectingeducation.org/sites/default/files/documents/protect_schools_and_universities
_from_military_use.pdf.
11
Anthony Shadid, Syria Escalates Crackdown as Tanks Go to Restive City, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 25, 2011, at A1.
12 Press Release, Security Council, Gains Made Protecting Children in Situations of Armed
Conflict Overshadowed by New Global Crises, Special Representative Tells Security Council,
U.N. Press Release SC/11552 (Sept. 8, 2014) [hereinafter U.N. S.C. Press Release].
13 Children, Not Soldiers, U.N. Office of the Special Rep. of the Secretary-General for
Children and Armed Conflict, https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/children-not-soldiers/.
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targeting eight states.14 But another detriment experienced by children as a
result of armed conflict is less well known: it is the armed forces’ use of
schools and universities, resulting in the injury and killing of children, as
well as disrupting their education.
Leading the campaign against such use has been the Global Coalition to
Protect Education from Attack (the Coalition), a joint effort of eight leading
nongovernment organizations such as the Council for At-Risk Academics,
Human Rights Watch, UNICEF, and the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization.15
Bede Sheppard, the Deputy
Children’s Rights Director at Human Rights Watch and chair of the
Coalition’s group on protecting schools and universities from military use,
explained in a mid-2014 statement that “[a]rmies and armed groups are
turning places of learning into battlefields by using them for military
purposes.”16 Between 2005 and 2013, schools and universities were utilized
by national armed forces in over twenty-three countries across Africa, Asia,
Europe, the Middle East.17 Included were countries such as Afghanistan,
Burma/Myanmar, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia, India, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Nepal,
Occupied Palestinian Territory/Israel, Pakistan, Philippines, Somalia, South
Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen.18 After
being overtaken by armed forces, schools and universities were used as
bases, barracks, detention facilities, interrogation and torture centers,
defensive or offensive positions, observation posts, military training
facilities, and weapons and ammunition storage.19 Sheppard recalled that
while researching the issue, he had seen: soldiers’ bunk-beds in teachers’ and
principals’ rooms in India; roadblocks outside of a school occupied by army
soldiers in Yemen’s capital; barbed wire surrounding a school in Thailand
where paramilitary forces had taken over classrooms; and soldiers guarding a
school’s entryway in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.20
14

Id.
COMMENTARY ON THE GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 2.
16 Norway: Leading Way to End Military Use of Schools, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 13,
2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/13/norway-leading-way-end-military-use-schools.
17
GCPEA, LESSONS IN WAR IN 2015: MILITARY USE OF SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES DURING
ARMED CONFLICT 32 (2015); PROTECT SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES FROM MILITARY USE,
supra note 10, at 5.
18 PROTECT SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES FROM MILITARY USE, supra note 10, at 10–11.
19 Id. at 5.
20 Bede Sheppard, From Sagene to Sanaa, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 7, 2013), http://
www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/07/sagene-sanaa.
15
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Military use of schools and universities has resulted in a decline of
student attendance and enrollment and in the availability of teachers.21
Further, the presence of armed forces in schools and universities leads to
students dropping out, lower rates of transition into higher education, and
overall poorer educational attainment.22 The ensuing damage and destruction
caused to educational buildings has led to long-term school closures and the
displacement of students into schools from home; this too reduces
enrollment.23 In some cases, only part of the school is taken over, exposing
students to sexual violence and forced labor.24 Most notably, military
occupation of schools and universities has resulted in the injury and death of
students and teachers alike.25
2. Syria
During the armed conflict in Syria, for example, both government forces
and opposing armed groups have used schools for military purposes.26
According to the 2014 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and
Armed Conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, the military use of schools and
attacks on schools in Syria “severely disrupted children’s right to access to
education.”27 Government forces and armed opposition groups alike have
damaged or destroyed school buildings.28
Schools in Syria have been used as barracks, operational bases, sniper
postings, and detention facilities—all while classes were in session.29 Over
twenty percent of Syria’s schools were transformed into shelters, depriving
almost 2 million students of their right to an education.30 Government
statistics estimated that, as of October 2013, 2.26 million children in Syria
either were not attending school or were attending irregularly.31 Similarly,
over 52,500 teachers and 523 school counselors in Syria did not attend
21

Id.
COMMENTARY ON THE GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 4.
23 PROTECT SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES FROM MILITARY USE, supra note 10, at 5.
24 Norway: Leading Way to End Military Use of Schools, supra note 16.
25 PROTECT SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES FROM MILITARY USE, supra note 10, at 5.
26 Syria: Attacks on Schools Endanger Students, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 6, 2013),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/05/syria-attacks-schools-endanger-students.
27 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed
Conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. S/2014/31 (Jan. 27, 2014).
28 Id.
29 Id. ¶ 44.
30 Id. ¶ 46.
31 Id. ¶ 40.
22
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work.32 More than 3,000 Syrian schools had been destroyed.33 Not only did
such uses occupy space that was meant for students, and thus force students
to conduct their learning elsewhere, these uses also converted schools and
universities into military targets under the laws of war, making both teachers
and students vulnerable to attack.34
Schools fell under attack from all parties to the war, including
government forces and armed opposition groups.35 Teachers and students
who fled Syria described instances in which students had been interrogated
and beaten by state security agents for allegedly engaging in anti-government
activity.36 Security forces and pro-government militias also assaulted
otherwise peaceful student demonstrations.37 Interrogations, arrests, and
raids at schools resulted in children staying home from school out of fear.38
Students also recalled instances when government snipers shot, injured, and
killed children at school.39
An elementary school student from Aleppo city was forced to take refuge
after an April 2014 attack on his school.40 Ahrar Al Sham, an armed
coalition participating in the Syrian war, had occupied his school since
2012.41 On April 30, 2012, this young boy and his brother attended an art
exhibition and singing event for children with their teacher at an elementary
school in Al Ansari Al Sharqi.42 Approximately 400 people filled the school
by 9 a.m., and hundreds more were expected to arrive.43 At about 9:05 a.m.,
however, the roar of a warplane preceded a force that thrust the boy back
against the wall.44 When he regained consciousness, he saw that the
schoolroom was destroyed, with shattered glass and large holes in the
ceiling, and a fourth-grade female student sitting on a chair, either
32

Id.
Id. ¶ 46.
34 COMMENTARY ON THE GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 4.
35 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in the Syrian Arab
Republic, supra note 27, ¶ 39.
36 Syria: Attacks on Schools Endanger Student, supra note 26.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in the Syrian Arab
Republic, supra note 27, ¶ 41.
40 Human Rights Council, 27th Sess., Selected Testimonies from Victims of the Syrian
Conflict, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/CPR.1, at 10 (Sept. 16, 2014).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 10–11.
43 Id. at 11.
44 Id.
33
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unconscious or dead.45 The boy was bleeding from his head, among other
injuries, but was quickly rescued by three men. When he finally returned
home, he learned that his younger brother had been killed in the incident.46
The boy’s father heard a loud explosion and saw smoke coming from the
elementary school.47 He rushed to the school, arriving within ten minutes.48
He said that the school building was severely damaged and “pools of blood
and dead bodies were scattered everywhere.”49 The father searched among
the students trapped beneath rubble and the bodies and severed body parts
for his children. He finally located his youngest son at the nearby hospital
with a serious head injury, but the child died while being transferred to
Turkey for medical treatment.50
The war in Syria has also disrupted higher education. The damage the
war has caused to universities has stripped students of the ability to attend
classes in those buildings.51 Increasing dangers prompted students to stay
home from school.52 It is likely that the education of hundreds of thousands
of students has been disrupted, and that thousands more have been prevented
from even beginning their pursuit of higher education.53
“Syrian children have had to face things in the horrors of war that no
child should have to bear—interrogated, targeted, and attacked,” stated
Priyanka Motaparthy, a children’s rights researcher at Human Rights Watch,
in a 2013 report.54 “Schools should be havens,” she continued, “but in a
country that once valued schooling, many Syrian children aren’t even getting
basic education and are losing out on their future.”55

45

Id.
Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 11–12.
51 KEITH WATENPAUGH, ADRIANNE FRICKE & JAMES KING, THE WAR FOLLOWS THEM 9
(June 2014), available at http://www.protectingeducation.org/sites/default/files/documents/
the_war_follows_them_iie-uc_davis_study_on_syrians_in_lebanon_and_higher_education_
june_2014.pdf.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 9–10.
54 Syria: Attacks on Schools Endanger Students, supra note 26.
55 Id.
46
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B. Response to Military Use of Schools: The Guidelines
1. Development Leading to Adoption of the Guidelines
In 2013, the Coalition released a report detailing how armed forces utilize
schools and universities in armed conflict and the resulting consequences of
this practice.56 One such consequence is students being deprived access to
education and being put at risk when educational facilities become legitimate
military targets under international law.57
In May 2012, the Coalition organized an expert consultation that was
hosted by the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights in Geneva, Switzerland.58 As a result of encouragement from
the May 2012 consultation attendees,59 a larger group of experts from around
the world met in November 2012 in Lucens, a village in the canton of Vaud
in Switzerland, to discuss the development of guidelines to protect schools
and universities from military use.60 Representatives from eleven states,
along with nongovernment organizations and U.N. agencies, reviewed and
provided significant feedback to the initial draft of the guidelines.61 This
initial draft was prepared by Dr. Steven Haines, a former senior officer in the
British Armed Forces, former chair of the editorial board of the United
Kingdom’s Joint Service Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict, and a
professor at the University of Greenwich.62 Dr. Haines then incorporated
revisions, formed a drafting committee for their review, and held
consultations for additional input.63 As a result of this process, in June 2013
the Coalition released the Draft Lucens Guidelines for Protecting Schools
and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict (Draft
Guidelines).64 Subsequently, the Coalition sought support from states,
multilateral institutions, and other organizations to finalize, and then adopt,
endorse, and implement these guidelines.65

56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

PROTECT SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES FROM MILITARY USE, supra note 10, at 3.
Id.
COMMENTARY ON THE GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Draft Guidelines were met with considerable support. At a
September 2014 Security Council meeting, Yoka Brandt, the Deputy
Executor Director of UNICEF, encouraged all member states to support and
implement the Draft Guidelines.66 Public statements in support of the Draft
Guidelines were issued or endorsed by Algeria, Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Croatia, Chile, Cote d’Ivoire, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, European
Parliament, Finland, France, Iceland Japan, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria,
Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Senegal, Slovenia, South Africa, South Sudan,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, as well as the Special Representative to the
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, the Security-General,
the U.N. Special Envoy for Global Education, Gordon Brown, the Global
Partnership for Education, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and
UNICEF.67 According to the Coalition, this support indicates a “growing
international interest in protecting schools and universities from military use
during armed conflict.”68
In support of their acceptance of the Draft Guidelines, Austria, Croatia,
and Slovenia issued a joint statement in March 2014 declaring that they are
“gravely concerned about the use of schools for any military purposes since
it is detrimental to the children’s rights to education, jeopardizing their
chances for the future.”69 They continued by expressing their desire to
“underline the right and access to education as a fundamental human right,”
and called the Draft Guidelines “a very concrete step forward” towards
achieving protection for educational institutions during times of conflict.70
Statements issued from each of the countries similarly expressed a deep
concern for the state of access to education in times of conflict.71 The
statements further contain expressions of welcome and commitment to the
Draft Guidelines.72
The finalized version of the Guidelines for Protecting Schools and
Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict was publicly released

66

U.N. S.C. Press Release, supra note 12.
Public Statements in Support of the Guidelines and Safe Schools Declaration, GCPEA,
http://www.protectingeducation.org/support-process.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
67
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on December 16, 2014 at an event in Geneva, Switzerland.73 Fifty-four
states have since endorsed and committed to implementing the Guidelines.74
2. Content of the Guidelines
The Guidelines urge parties to armed conflict to refrain from using
schools and universities in any way supporting their military efforts, even
uses that would not be contrary to the law of armed conflict.75 It urges
parties to avoid “impinging on students’ safety and education,” and instead
use the Guidelines as a tool to avoid such situations.76 The Commentary on
the Guidelines provides an introduction, and the document itself contains six
actual guidelines. The introduction and the Guidelines include the following:
Introduction: The introduction to the Guidelines details the military use of
schools and universities during armed conflict.77 It gives information on the
right to education and the need to protect schools and children from the
effects of armed conflict.78 The introduction further explains that the
Guidelines were drafted “with the aim of reducing the use of schools and
universities by parties to armed conflict in support of their military effort,
and to minimise the negative impact that armed conflict has on students’
safety and education.”79
Guideline 1 [Injunction against Use of Functioning Schools]: This
guideline states that functioning schools and universities should not be used
by parties to armed conflict in any way that supports the military initiative,
even when the school or university is temporarily closed, at times outside of
school hours, or on weekend, holidays, and vacation periods.80
Guideline 2 [Efforts to Avoid Using Abandoned or Evacuated Schools]:
This guideline states that schools or universities that have been abandoned or
evacuated should not be used for military purposes unless there is no viable

73

COMMENTARY ON THE GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 7.
Safe Schools Declaration Endorsements, GCPEA, http://protectingeducation.org/guideli
nes/support.
75 GCPEA, GUIDELINES FOR PROTECTING SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES FROM MILITARY USE
DURING ARMED CONFLICT (2014) [hereinafter THE GUIDELINES], http://protectingeducation.
org/sites/default/files/documents/guidelines_en.pdf.
76 Id.
77 COMMENTARY ON THE GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 4–5.
78 Id. at 4.
79 Id.
80 THE GUIDELINES, supra note 75.
74
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alternative to obtaining a similar military advantage.81 Even if the alternative
building is not as conveniently placed or configured, the guideline contends
that the alternative site should be regarded as a better option.82 These
schools should only be occupied for the minimum necessary time, and
should always be available for re-opening as an educational institution as
soon as practical.83 Furthermore, any damage to the school or university
should be repaired as soon as possible, and all remnants of war should be
removed from the site.84
Guideline 3 [Injunction against Destroying Schools to Deprive Use]: This
guideline explains that schools and universities are “civilian objects,” and as
such they “must never be destroyed as a measure intended to deprive the
opposing parties to the armed conflict of the ability to use them in the
future.”85
Guideline 4 [Efforts to Avoid Attacking Schools]: This guideline explains
that using schools and universities for military purposes may subject those
institutions to attack.86 The guideline continues that parties should consider
“all feasible alternative measures before attacking [schools], including,
unless circumstances do not permit, warning the enemy in advance that an
attack will be forthcoming unless it ceases its use.”87 This guideline further
recommends that parties to armed conflict take into consideration the special
protection afforded to children and the negative effect an attack could have
on the community’s access to education if the school were to be damaged or
destroyed.88 It states that the use of a school or university “in support of the
military effort should not serve as justification for an opposing party that
captures it to continue to use it in support of the military effort,” and that as
soon as possible the educational facility should be vacated and returned to its
educational function.89
Guideline 5 [Efforts to Avoid Employing Parties to Armed Forces as
School Security]: This guideline advises that parties to armed conflict should
not be employed to provide security for schools and universities unless
81

Id.
Id. The guideline states that buildings otherwise protected under International
Humanitarian Law, such as hospitals, are not to be regarded as better options.
83
Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
82
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alternative means are not available, and that, if possible, civilian personnel
should be in these positions.90 The guideline continues that if such fighting
forces engage in security tasks at schools and universities, they should stay
away from the school grounds and buildings to the extent possible in order to
protect its civilian status and learning environment.91
Guideline 6 [Requirement to Incorporate the Guidelines]: This guideline
states that all parties to armed conflict should, to the extent possible and
appropriate and through the most appropriate method, incorporate the
Guidelines into their doctrine, military manuals, rules of engagement,
operational orders, and other means of dissemination, to encourage
appropriate practice throughout the chain of command.92
The Commentary on the Guidelines also provides the applicable
international legal framework, examples of domestic law, guidance, practice,
and notes and references.93 The section titled “Analysis of the International
Legal Framework Relating to Military Use of Schools during Armed
Conflict” provides the legal framework “applicable to the targeting of
schools and universities,” focusing on International Humanitarian Law.94
This section also provides information on International Human Rights Law, a
list of quotes from relevant international treaty provisions, and relevant
international guidance.95 The next section, titled “Examples of Relevant
Domestic Law, Guidance, and Practice” provides evidence of good practice
already applied by some states and non-state parties to protect schools and
universities during armed conflict.96 It begins with legislation from various
countries protecting educational institutions, typically requiring written
authorization for use of schools during armed conflict.97 It continues to
include peacekeeping doctrinal guidance, relevant guidance in military
manuals and doctrine, jurisprudence, governmental guidance, and practice of
non-state parties to armed conflict.98 The Commentary on the Guidelines
concludes with a list of notes and references.99

90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

THE GUIDELINES, supra note 75.
Id.
Id.
COMMENTARY ON THE GUIDELINES, supra note 6.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9–13.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id. at 15–17.
Id. at 22.
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3. Intended Impact of the Guidelines Take Effect
According to the Coalition, the Guidelines were created “to provide
concrete guidance to states and non-state armed groups on how to reduce the
use of schools and universities by armed parties and to minimize the negative
impact that armed conflict has on students’ safety and education.”100 In
December 2014, Sheppard wrote that the Guidelines are “intended to respond
to the practice of government forces and non-state armed groups converting
schools and universities into bases or barracks, or using them as firing
positions or places to cache weapons and ammunition.” Specifically, the
document is intended to guide individuals involved in planning and
implementing military operations as they consider whether to use schools
and universities.101
The Guidelines are similarly meant to help
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations monitor activity
related to the conduct of armed conflict and the military use of schools.102
The Guidelines provide suggested actions that each government should
implement to end the military use of schools.103 The Guidelines are not
meant to change international law and are not legally binding in
themselves.104 Rather, they are intended to “lead to a shift in behavior that
will lead to better protections for schools and universities in times of armed
conflict . . . .”105 The Guidelines acknowledge that parties to armed conflict
face difficult dilemmas that require pragmatic solutions; aiming to achieve
what is practical, they suggest that states adopt the Guidelines “in the spirit
in which they are promulgated, and to adapt them in practice to suit their
specific circumstances.”106
The Guidelines are intended for wide
dissemination and implementation, and have therefore been crafted for use
by all parties to armed conflict.107
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III. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. Binding International Law Governing Education and Armed Conflict
1. International Education-Rights Law
International law guarantees the child’s right to an education.108 Adopted
in 1948, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, proclaimed in Article
26 that “[e]veryone has the right to education.”109 The right to education has
since been widely recognized internationally, and has been further elaborated
upon within the Children’s Convention.110 Moreover, the right to education
has also been adopted into regional treaties, and is protected by many
national constitutions.111
The Children’s Convention explicitly recognizes education as a legal
right.112 Article 28 states:
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to education,
and with a view to achieving this right progressively and on the
basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in particular:
(a) Make primary education compulsory and available free
to all;
(b) Encourage the development of different forms of
secondary education . . . [and] make them available and
accessible to every child . . .;
(c) Make higher education accessible to all . . .;
(e) Take measures to encourage regular attendance at
schools and the reduction of drop-out rates.113

108 Understanding Education as a Right, RIGHT TO EDUCATION PROJECT, http://www.rightto-education.org/node/3.
109 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 26, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217 (III) (Dec. 10, 1948). Syria was one of forty-eight votes in favor of adopting the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 1948 U.N.Y.B. 524, U.N. Sales No. 1950.I.2.
110
Children’s Convention, supra note 3, art. 28.
111 See generally RIGHT TO EDUCATION PROJECT, INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS – RIGHT TO
EDUCATION (2014), available at http://www.right-to-education.org/sites/right-to-education.
org/files/resource-attachments/RTE_International_Instruments_Right_to_Education_2014.pdf
(listing both the international and regional instruments that guarantee the right to education).
112 Children’s Convention, supra note 3, art. 28
113 Id.
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2. International Humanitarian Law
International humanitarian law, also called the law of armed conflict,
restricts the means and methods of warfare to protect people who are not
participating in hostilities.114 In Article 52, Additional Protocol I states:
1. Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of
reprisals. Civilian objects are all objects which are not military
objectives as defined in paragraph 2.
2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so
far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to
those objects which by their nature, location, purpose, or use
make an effective contribution to military action and whose
total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
advantage.
3. In case of doubt whether an object which is normally
dedicated to civilian purposes, such as . . . a school, is being
used to make an effective contribution to military action, it
shall be presumed not to be so used.115
The Guidelines acknowledge that “educational facilities are ordinarily
civilian objects,” and, as such, are “not to be targeted unless they are turned
into military objectives.”116 The military may therefore transform these
learning institutions into legitimate military objectives under international
law by using them as an “effective contribution to military action.”117
The intentional attack of an educational building is also listed as a war
crime punishable by Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court.118 However, the statute makes an exception for schools that
have become military objectives:
2. For the purpose of this Statute, “war crimes” means:

114 What is International Humanitarian Law?, ICRC, https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/
other/what_is_ihl.pdf.
115 Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 52.
116 COMMENTARY ON THE GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 4.
117 Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 52(2).
118 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
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(ix) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings
dedicated to . . . education . . . provided they are not
military objectives.119
As the Guidelines point out, “[t]he right to education means little if
students cannot safely attend school or university.”120
B. Gap in the Law: Neither Education-Rights nor Humanitarian Law
Treaties Expressly Ban All Military Use of Schools
Traditional sources of international law include international conventions,
or treaties, establishing expressly recognized rules by states, international
custom evidenced by general practice accepted as law, general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations, and judicial decisions and scholarly
teachings.121 As stated above, some treaties establish the child’s right to an
education and protect educational facilities from attack; some of these
guarantees also qualify as customary international law.122 While deliberate
attacks on schools are prohibited, passive military uses of these facilities
often transform them into military objectives.123 Consequently, once a
school becomes a military objective it becomes exposed to attack.124 There
is no written law, nor any clear custom, protecting schools from military use
during armed conflict, creating a gap in the law that has put schools,
students, and teachers in danger. By guiding individuals involved in the
planning of military operations to avoid the use of school buildings, the
Guidelines intend to reduce the use of schools and universities by armed
parties and close this dangerous gap in the law.125
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IV. EVALUATION OF THE DEGREE THAT THE GUIDELINES MIGHT HELP END
THE MILITARY USE OF SCHOOLS
A. The Guidelines as Soft Law
The devastating effects in Syria from the military use of schools and
universities during armed conflict demonstrate a gap between the laws that
protect the child’s right to an education and those that protect educational
facilities from attack.126 This gap allows the military, under international
law, to transform learning institutions into legitimate targets for attack by
turning those facilities into military objectives.127
One potential solution to this gap would be to establish and implement a
multilateral treaty regulating the military use of schools during armed
conflict. Treaties are often a preferred form of law for a variety of
reasons.128 First, treaties have identifiable content,129 and plainly provide the
terms of international legal rules.130 In addition, treaties also reflect the
formal consent of states to be bound by the instrument’s terms,131 and thus
establish legal rights and duties that carry an expectation of obedience
between sovereign states.132
Nevertheless, the legal status, clarity, and pressure of compliance
associated with treaties are combatted by disadvantages of using these
instruments within the arena of international law.133 For example, treaties
often require cumbersome procedures of approval and ratification,134 which
necessarily entail formal negotiation and express consent; processes that
could be circumvented through alternative forms of international law.135
Moreover, treaties are also limited instruments in that they may fail to meet
the needs of a changing situation, and are only binding on those states that
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ratify and consent to their encompassed terms.136 Lastly, treaties can be
more difficult to amend than other forms of international law.137
Given these drawbacks, and in the absence of the traditional international
law sources, states have resorted to nontraditional forms of lawmaking to
regulate international activity.138 Often called “soft law,” these forms can be
an attractive alternative when the traditional forms of international law
recognized in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, such as treaties
and custom, are insufficient to regulate the issue at hand.139 Soft law’s
advantages over hard law include the fact that soft law instruments are not
confined to those states who consent to ratification, and as a result may also
be used to induce participation from non-consenting states.140 Moreover, soft
law can be adopted more rapidly because it does not require the formal
procedures of approval necessary to establish binding hard law.141
Soft law, however, also has disadvantages when compared to its hard law
counterparts. Soft law instruments are not legally binding.142 Moreover,
since soft law is not binding, it is controversial with respect to the legal force
it is afforded.143 Soft law alternatives are also frequently created by non-state
actors, such as nongovernment agencies. Such doubtful law-making
authority can render soft law instruments variable and elusive.144
The Guidelines were created as a soft law instrument to govern the
military use of schools during armed conflict.145 As mentioned above, the
Guidelines are primarily the work of nongovernmental organizations, who
then prodded U.N. officials and representatives of states to join.146 Since soft
law approaches, like the Guidelines, offer both advantages and disadvantages
when compared to hard law approaches,147 it is important to assess whether
the underlying goals of the Guidelines are furthered by soft law advantages
sufficient to overcome the disadvantages of not choosing a hard-law
alternative.
136
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It is gravely evident by the situation in Syria that the military use of
schools during armed conflict is a problem that calls for timely response. 148
If remedy of this situation were sought in the form of a treaty, burdensome
procedures in search of approval could take a substantial amount of time.
This would allow the military use of schools to continue. Consequently,
students would continue to have their education disrupted and their lives
endangered by these circumstances,149 while lawmakers take steps to create
binding law.150 Soft law is generally adopted much more rapidly because it
does not entail the procedures that render hard law binding.151 Therefore, the
Guidelines will better serve the timely needs of the military use of schools
during armed conflict than a treaty would.
In addition, an issue that often arises from attempting to regulate
international activity is the willingness of countries to become amenable to
the regulation. Since treaties require the affirmative consent from each state
party,152 states may be less likely to join a treaty out of fear of repercussion
stemming from a failure to adhere to the express terms of a particular
instrument.153 It is therefore persuasive that the Guidelines, as soft law, will
meet the desire of “wide dissemination”154 and greater participation by states
and non-state actors better than a hard law alternative.
Another consideration is the textual confinement of a treaty. Treaties are
difficult to amend, and can fail to meet the changing needs of the situation.155
It could be detrimental to criminalize the military use of schools during
armed conflict because the needs of war change. In some narrow
circumstances, the greater good may be satisfied by the military use of
schools. In this way, the flexible nature and fluidity of the Guidelines
renders it more conducive to the ever-changing needs of situations impacted
by armed conflict.
Another particular concern with soft law instruments is that they are, by
definition, not law.156 Such instruments therefore lose the pressures for

148 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in the Syrian Arab
Republic, supra note 27, ¶¶ 40, 46.
149 Id.
150
DUNOFF, supra note 128, at 93.
151 Id.
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154 COMMENTARY TO THE GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 5.
155 DUNOFF, supra note 128, at 93.
156 Id. at 94.
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compliance associated with treaties.157 This brings up grave concerns of
enforceability. However, wide implementation of the Guidelines may, over
time, become customary international law, and thus imply state consent
through state practice.158 It is settled that by “the general assent of civilized
nations,” that a practice may become “of universal obligation.”159 This
enforceability, however, requires a ripening over time.160 Nevertheless, it is
evident that a soft law approach in the form of the Guidelines best satisfies
the remedial needs of the military use of schools during armed conflict,
regardless of their lack of enforceability, because they do not preclude a
more binding alternative from forming.
After consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of using the
Guidelines to remedy the military use of schools during armed conflict, as
opposed to a hard law approach, it is evident that the need for a rapidly
adaptable, changeable, and more inclusive form of lawmaking prevails over
the accountability benefits that a hard law approach could provide. It is now
pertinent to conclude whether this soft law approach satisfies the
recommendations and goals set forth by the Coalition to end the military use
of schools during armed conflict.
B. Evaluating This Soft-Law Option against Key Criteria
The Coalition, before the release of the finalized Guidelines in December
2014, set out a list of proposed criteria for the Guidelines in the form of
recommended solutions and goals.161 The proposed criteria included:
recognition that the military use of schools during armed conflict is a
common practice in need of a remedy; adherence to international law,
including international humanitarian law and international human rights law;
promoting implementation of the Guidelines’ ban; the monitoring and
reporting of activity; and encouraging the mitigation of harm.162 In
addressing whether, and to what effect, the Guidelines will remedy the
military use of schools during armed conflict, it is first pertinent to determine
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whether the Guidelines further the recommendations and goals issued by the
Coalition.
1. Raising Awareness of the Scope and Gravity of the Problem
The Coalition suggested that recognition of the negative impact caused by
military use of schools during armed conflict would aid in stop the
practice.163 Specifically, governments, non-state armed groups, and other
actors “should acknowledge that military use of schools and other education
institutions is a common practice in armed conflict that requires a concerted
response at both the national and international level.”164
This recommendation is first addressed in the introduction to the
Guidelines.165 The introduction promotes awareness of the gravity of the
problem by explaining how and why the military uses schools during armed
conflict and the resulting dangers and disruption to children’s education.166
The introduction also provides a means to increase exposure by stating that
the Guidelines are meant for wide dissemination and implementation167 and
asserting that greater access to the Guidelines would increase awareness.
Further, the sixth guideline calls for incorporation of the Guidelines into
military documents to increase dissemination throughout the chain of
command and raise awareness for those best situated to implement the
Guidelines.168
What the introduction does not do, however, is sufficiently emphasize the
gravity of the situation. Data and statistics, such as the number of schools
that have been used and the number of students consequently denied access
to their education, could help emphasize the extent of the problem and its
need for address. Data of this nature inevitably change as time passes;
nevertheless, physical numbers may be more effective in helping readers to
recognize the impact that military use of schools has had. Perhaps it would
also be more persuasive to use concrete examples of instances, such as in
Syria, in which the gravity of the effects of the use of schools has manifested
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in a clear way.169 On the other hand, the Guidelines may be disserved by
singling out a specific country or countries.
In sum, the Coalition desires acknowledgment that military use of schools
is a common practice in need of an international response, but does not
adequately demonstrate that this practice is common. While the introduction
does clearly state how the military use of schools impacts education, it does
not express the extent to which schools are being impacted and the
devastating number of students who have experienced disruption in their
education.170 Information of this nature may help both to increase the
knowledge and understanding of the degree to which the military use of
schools affects education, and to induce implementation of the Guidelines.
2. Advancing Adherence to Applicable Binding Law
Another solution recommended by the Coalition is to promote adherence
to current international law, including international humanitarian law and
international human rights law.171 The Coalition describes adherence to
these laws as taking “all feasible precautions to protect the civilian
population and civilian objects, including schools and universities, against
the effects of attacks.”172 The Coalition continues that, at a minimum,
adherence “means prohibiting the military use of schools and universities
while they continue to be used as education institutions.”173
Applicable binding international laws are recognized in the introduction
to the Guidelines and also described in great detail in the Commentary on the
Guidelines.174 The Commentary on the Guidelines also provide relevant
treaty provisions and international guidance, such as resolutions from the
Security Council.175 The Guidelines sufficiently explain these laws and the
rights they afford. Further, the Guidelines provide statements from states
that have vowed to adhere to international law and prohibit the military use
of schools. The President of the Syrian Opposition Coalition and Chief of
Staff of Supreme Military Council in the Free Syrian Army signed a
Declaration in April 2013 that states: “[O]ccupation [of schools] by military
169 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in the Syrian Arab
Republic, supra note 27, ¶¶ 40, 46.
170 Id.
171 PROTECT SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES FROM MILITARY USE, supra note 10, at 13.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 COMMENTARY ON THE GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 4, 9–13.
175 Id.
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forces represents a direct violation of domestic and international
law. . . . [T]he Free Syrian Army today states its official position prohibiting
the militarization of schools . . . .”176 It appears that the Guidelines satisfy
the recommendation to advance adherence to applicable binding law.
3. Promoting Implementation of the Guidelines’ Ban
The Coalition stated that the Guidelines should assist servicemen “in their
decision-making during battlefield situations and military operations.”177
The Guidelines also assist commanders and military planners to prepare
ahead and lessen the need to use schools and universities.178 Specifically, the
recommendation suggests that parties to armed forces “amend their military
manuals, train their personnel, and issue military orders in line with good
practice, including prohibiting armed forces from using schools and
universities.”179
Guideline 6 specifically calls for the implementation of the Guidelines
into “doctrine, military manuals, rules of engagement, operational orders,
and other means of dissemination, to encourage appropriate practice
throughout the chain of command.”180 The Guidelines suggest prohibiting
the use of schools by armed forces and includes examples of good
practices.181 The Guidelines thus give specific instructions on how the
Guidelines’ ban of the military use of schools is to be implemented into
military protocol. The President of Syrian Opposition Coalition of the Free
Syrian Army pledged to comply with this recommended implementation in a
signed Declaration.182 The Declaration stated that the statement prohibiting
the military use of schools “will be circulated among all of our battalions and
guide the actions of our members.”183 As made clear by the language of the
Guidelines and the resulting Declaration by Syria, the Guidelines adequately
fulfill the recommendation of strengthening legal standards by promoting the
implementation of the Guidelines’ ban.
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4. Monitoring Compliance
Another of the Coalition’s recommendations is to “give greater attention
to monitoring and reporting on military use of schools and education
institutions . . . whenever it occurs.”184 This recommendation is especially
important, because without knowledge that the Guidelines’ ban on the
military use of schools has been violated, it is impossible to take measures to
remedy that violation.
The introduction to the Guidelines merely suggests that the Guidelines are
used “as a tool for inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations
engaged in monitoring, programming, and advocacy related to the conduct of
armed conflict.”185 The Guidelines themselves do not give any guidance on
how local organizations, states, and agencies should monitor and report
violations of the Guidelines. Similarly, the Declaration in Syria states that
“[a]ny individuals found to violate the principles listed in our proclamation
will be held accountable . . . .”186 However, violators will only be held
accountable if their violations are discovered. The Guidelines merely
suggest that governments “credibly and impartially investigate and
prosecute” violators.187 Suggestions on a specific monitoring structure may
have been helpful in assuring proper enforcement of the Guidelines. Instead,
the Guidelines left it up to each state to create a monitoring system.
5. Encouraging Mitigation of Harm
The Coalition stated that the Guidelines will assist “[g]overnments and
international and domestic organizations in . . . mitigating the harmful
consequences when parties to a conflict do use schools.”188 The Guidelines
require parties to armed conduct to completely remove traces of their use of
the school and make every effort to remedy any damage caused to school
buildings. Unfortunately, the Guidelines’ remedial measures only focus on
fixing the building, and show no concern for the students who have been
deprived of their education for years.
Just as the Guidelines require that the military remedy any damage done
to school buildings, the Guidelines should also require that the government
184
185
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187
188
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take steps to provide the educational opportunities that have been forfeited
by students. As demonstrated by both the Guidelines189 and the Children’s
Convention,190 education is an invaluable tool in maintaining and furthering
society. Preserving the right to education is of great importance, but
ensuring that the students who have been deprived of their education receive
an opportunity to make up those lost years is similarly important.
Upon requiring that governments address the years of education lost by
students, the Guidelines should also provide suggestions to governments on
how to do so. These suggestions on how to remedy the years of education
lost would likely serve a parallel purpose of promoting re-enrollment in
schools. For example, the Guidelines could suggest that a maximum age for
grade school be extended. Similarly, the Guidelines could suggest that
governments create an accelerated educational program for students who
were deprived of their education for some period of time. The Guidelines
could also suggest that university students be incentivized to return to their
voluntary academic pursuits. Regardless of what suggestions are made, it is
pertinent that the generation gap in education resulting from the military use
of schools during armed conflict is not ignored.
Lastly, it is important to address whether the Coalition’s
recommendations are, in themselves, useful to end the military use of schools
and universities during armed conflict. The recommendations provide a
comprehensive approach that covers raising awareness of the problem,
encouraging recognition of the right to education, promoting adherence to
the laws that seek to prevent attacks on educational institutions vis-à-vis
implementation of the Guidelines, and monitoring and punishing
violations.191 The recommended criteria adequately flesh out the elements
necessary for an effective and comprehensive approach to ending the
military use of schools during armed conflict. However, it appears that the
Guidelines may fall short of fully satisfying these recommendations. In
particular, the Guidelines fall short of satisfying the recommendation that
they provide specific guidance on monitoring for violations and holding
violators accountable.
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C. Additional Measures to Improve This Soft-Law Regime
This Note has addressed potential shortcomings of the Guidelines by
comparing the Guidelines with the recommendations for remedying the
military use of schools during armed conflict issued by the Coalition.192
The Guidelines fall short of the Coalition’s recommendations in two very
important ways. First, the Guidelines do not adequately emphasize the
gravity of the consequences that occur as a result of the military use of
schools during armed conflict. Servicemen may be more likely to avoid
using schools if they fully understand the devastating effects such a decision
could have on children’s safety and access to education. In response to this
potential shortcoming, this Note suggests that the Guidelines stress, in
greater detail, the gravity of the effects resulting from the military use of
schools during armed conflict.
Second, the Guidelines should take strides to provide adequate
information on how to monitor and report activity that violates the
Guidelines or ways to investigate and prosecute these violations. The ability
to monitor and report violations is crucial to determining who to hold
accountable for these violations, and the ability to prosecute these violators is
crucial to ensuring that the Guidelines are enforced. Therefore, the
Guidelines need to address these issues directly, rather than in passing, to
help a country such as Syria to effectively and efficiently put an end to the
military use of schools during armed conflict. As one potential solution to
this shortcoming, the Guidelines could suggest that an oversight committee
be established within the chain of command to be responsible for identifying
violations of the Guidelines.
Lastly, and potentially most importantly, is the Guidelines’ failure to
suggest that governments should, or how governments could, remedy the
years of education that have been forfeited as a result of the military use of
schools during armed conflict. Without action, an entire generation will fall
victim to an educational gap, even after the military use of schools has
ceased. A reparations structure should be developed to provide an education
to the children who have been deprived one.
The Guidelines could also recommend that each state create provisions
for criminal prosecution for violations of the Guidelines. National provisions
of this kind would deter violations and increase adherence to the Guidelines.
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V. CONCLUSION
As a result of conflict around the world, armed forces are using schools
and universities to further military objectives, thereby disrupting students’
education and turning schools into legitimate military targets.193 The
Guidelines were created to stop the military use of schools during armed
conflict.194 This Note evaluated the effectiveness of the Guidelines by first
determining that the Guidelines met most of the Coalition’s recommended
solutions and calls for action. It also determined that authoritative soft law,
such as the Guidelines, is a better remedy for this problem than a hard law
alternative.
Although the effects of the military use of schools in Syria have been
devastating, the Guidelines have inspired the Syrian military to take
preventative strides by prohibiting such actions and seeking to end the
military use of schools. These strides could save the lives of children, lessen
their exposure to sexual violence, forced labor, and injury, and restore their
ability to pursue an education. There are, however, a few ways in which the
Guidelines could further these initiatives. This Note suggests that one such
way to improve the effectiveness of the Guidelines is for the Guidelines to
emphasize the gravity of the consequences that result from the military use
of schools during armed conflict. This could motivate servicemen to give
greater deference to the Guidelines. Next, the Guidelines should provide
suggestions on how to monitor and report violations of the Guidelines to
increase accountability. The Guidelines should also require governments to
take measures to remedy the years of education lost and suggest a reparation
structure for governments to implement. These suggestions could further the
effectiveness of the Guidelines in putting an end to the military use of
schools in Syria and remedying the damage it causes.
Finally, this Note urges governments to adopt the Guidelines and join the
initiative to end the military use of schools during armed conflict, and allow
children to attend school without fear.
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